CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Working Group on the Way Ahead

(22 June 2017)

Agenda item 1 and 2 with general focus on the ban of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices

Statement by Ambassador Farukh Amil

Permanent Representative of Pakistan

Mr. Co-Facilitator,

We thank you once again for leading these discussions. My delegation participated interactively in the first session of our discussions last Tuesday, and will engage constructively in the rest of the meeting. I have structured my intervention according to the topics identified in your letter of 12 June.

Starting with Treaty Definitions. In terms of fissile material, Pakistan is of the view that any fissionable material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons should be covered in the definition. Besides enriched uranium and separated plutonium, the definition should also encompass neptunium and americium, as well as any other material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, for instance reactor-grade plutonium. The exact isotopic compositions and enrichment levels can be determined during negotiations in a manner that closes all possible loopholes.

As for defining fissile material production, all known processes that can be employed for the production of the defined fissile material must be covered in the treaty. The definition of fissile material production facilities should not be limited to enrichment and reprocessing plants only. Any facility that is capable of producing fissile material, as defined under the treaty, must be appropriately identified and covered under the treaty’s regime.

Such as approach would not only cover all loopholes, but would also be non-discriminatory with equal obligations for all states.

Mr. Co-Facilitator,

Turning over to Treaty Verification. Pakistan is of the view that in order to be effective and credible, the treaty should provide for a robust verification mechanism overseen by an independent treaty body that is capable of detecting any non-compliance in a timely manner, without any discrimination between states.

Pakistan favours the so-called “comprehensive approach” whereby all nuclear material and facilities covering the entire front and back end of the fuel cycle would be subject to verification, and not just be limited to production facilities like enrichment and reprocessing plants.

There is neither any insurmountable technical barrier nor any crippling financial requirement that would prevent the Member States of the CD from pursuing the comprehensive approach. We do not want be distracted or misled by self-serving arguments relying on technical and financial pretexts. Choosing between the so-called focused approach, the comprehensive approach and the hybrid approach is a political decision and should be seen as such.

The verification system should provide timely detection of any diversion or non-compliance. It should also provide credible assurance regarding the absence of any undeclared or proscribed activity.

All the post-entry-into-force production of fissile material for permissible purposes should be under the treaty’s verification coverage. At the same time, the treaty’s verification regime should also be able to encompass the agreed-upon categories and quantities of existing stocks of fissile material. Depending on the provisions included in the treaty, the verification regime must be capable of verifying the reduction of fissile material stocks as agreed between the states parties on a regional or global basis.

The verification obligations under the treaty would apply to the nuclear weapons possessing states. For the non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT, compliance with the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol already provide the desired level of assurance.

Mr. Co-Facilitator,

Lastly, let me address the Legal and Institutional Aspects. The verification tasks under the treaty should be implemented by an independent and dedicated body, an FMTO, without excluding the use of IAEA resources. The responsibility to verify and oversee the treaty’s implementation cannot be assigned exclusively to the IAEA. Besides the problems arising from differences between the membership of the IAEA and the treaty, the Agency’s decision making organs and procedures are not inclusive and transparent enough to effectively perform the oversight function. The states parties would, therefore, need to establish a treaty body with an appropriately staffed Secretariat, a Conference of States Parties meeting periodically, and an executive council that includes all the major stakeholders on a permanent basis, meeting regularly and taking all decisions by consensus.

For dealing with cases of non-compliance, the FMTO should first and foremost try to resolve them through consultations and clarifications as well as technical means. Those cases that cannot be suitably resolved may be referred to the UN General Assembly in a non-discriminatory manner. The referral to the UN Security Council would not be a feasible option as the Security Council would be unable to deal objectively with cases of non-compliance by a permanent veto-wielding member, which in the case of FMT would form the majority of fissile material producers.

As for amendment provisions to allow inter alia for technological change, we are of the view that it would be important to keep the treaty up to date with the technological changes. However, as a treaty that is negotiated and adopted under the consensus rule, its amendments should also only be agreed by consensus among all states parties.

For the treaty to enter into force, the minimum threshold should require ratification by all states that produce fissile materials as defined in the treaty. The treaty must be of a limited duration, with the possibility of a renewal by consensus. This would allow for a serious review before the expiry of the initial duration with respect to its implementation, effectiveness, contribution to nuclear disarmament, etc.

Like all treaties impacting on national security interests, states parties must be able to withdraw from the FMT, following an appropriate notice on the grounds of their national security. However, any withdrawing state would continue to remain accountable for any violations or non-compliance of the treaty while it was still a party to it.

Mr. Co-Facilitator,

I have addressed all the points that were included in your letter for today’s discussion. This is without prejudice to our position that it is premature to discuss other issues in detail, while the fundamental question of the treaty’s objective and scope remains unresolved.

We will provide your delegation with copies of all the statements made by us during these discussions, for their appropriate incorporation in your report.

I thank you, Mr. Co-Facilitator.